In this paper we analyze a dynamic agency problem where contracting parties do not know the agent's future productivity at the beginning of the relationship. We consider a two-period model where both the agent and the principal observe the agent's second-period productivity at the end of the...

When two or more agents compete for a bonus and the agents' productivity in each of several possible occurrences depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn,...

We consider guilt averse agents and principals and study the effects ofguilt on optimal behavior of the principal and the agent in a moral hazardmodel.The principal’s contract proposal contains a target effort in addition tothe monetary incentive scheme. By accepting the agreement, the...

Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, in die ökonomische Analyse des Versicherungsbetrugs einzuführenund einige grundlegende Determinanten für vertragswidriges Verhalten von Versicherungsnehmern aufzuzeigen. Dazu werden zunächst die strategischen Entscheidungsprobleme von Versicherungsneh-mern und...

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agents effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, promo-tion tournaments and individual performance pay need to be...

Die Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie befasst sich vornehmlich mit betriebswirtschaftlichen Problemen, dieaus Interessenskonflikten in Vertragsbeziehungen bei asymmetrischer Information resultieren. Esexistiert eine große Vielfalt unterschiedlicher Theorievarianten, die sich jedoch um...

The background for the general mathematical link between utility and informationtheory investigated in this paper is a simple financial market model with two kinds of small traders: less informed traders and insiders, whose extra information is represented by an enlargement of the other agents...

Implementing performance pay requires that workers' output be measured. Whenmeasurement costs differ among firms, those with a measurement cost advantage choose toimplement performance pay. They attract the best workers, and both the level and variabilityof compensation are higher at these firms...

We analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the...

Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationshipand arm's-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bankfinancing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than bothmonopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank...