This paper deals with the coordination mechanismus for R&D and innovation concering transnational corporations.

Eine Seite über die Zukunft der Innovationsforschung.Das kann doch nicht so schwer sein?Man kommt aber leicht ins Grübeln. Soll ichjetzt schreiben über Innovation in der Zukunft,also über die Entwicklung des Objekts der Innovationsforschung?Die Innovationsforschungwird sich in der Zukunft...

Gelegentlich kann der Eindruck entstehen, dasssich gesellschaftlicher Strukturwandel, strukturpolitischeKonzepte und wissenschaftliche Analysendieses Wandels einen Wettlauf liefern. Undeine nüchterne Betrachtung lässt keinen Zweifeldaran, dass in diesem Wettlauf die Wissenschafthinterherhinkt....

In this paper I argue that it makes no sense to have "innovation theories", or the use of a concept in describing the potential of social economic theories to explain the phenomenon of non-equlibirium. If we whish to explain dynamic, change, evolution, revolution, etc. in socio-economic systems,...

We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfareand two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly differentcountry-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities inseven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous...

This paper revisits the move to the market hypothesis proposed by Malone et al. (1987) andargues that, although compatible with empirical results, the theoretical basis of this hypothesisis flawed since no clear distinction is made between coordination mechanisms and forms ofgovernance. Based on...

Though auctions show a prevailing dominance in electronic markets, our understanding of howauctions work on human behaviour is still rather limited. In this paper we analyse the impact ofemotional processes on the decision making of human agents in electronic auctions. The analysis isbased on a...

This lecture is a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideasare fleshed out in a book Natural Justice, which is itself a condensed versionof an earlier two-volume book Game Theory and the Social Contract (Binmore[14, 12, 13])...

Collusive agreements are often observed in procurement auctions. They are probablymore easily achieved when competitors’ costs are easily estimated. If, however, the individualcosts of bidders are private information, effective ring formation is difficult to realize.We compare experimentally...

Within the setting of two simple two-person coordinationgames the formation of subjective strategies is observed experimentally.Though the structure of the game is unknown playersuse their actions in order to coordinate on a specific equilibrium.Strategies enable them to interpret the...