Within a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may,first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose workeffort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for bothtasks as offered by...

In this paper we aim - through an ‘experimentally-adapted’ Contingent Valuation survey -to look into the attributes of Ghanaians’ willingness-to-pay for green products. This would help usaddressing two main issues: first, from a theoretical point of view, we shall assess whether...

Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback onthe losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback isnot given. Furthermore, bids tend to be above the equilibrium predictions for riskneutral bidders. While the latter...

Sick pay is a common provision in most labor contracts. This paperemploys an experimental gift-exchange environment to explore two relatedquestions using both managers and undergraduates as subjects.First, do workers reciprocate generous sick pay with higher effort? Second,do firms benefit from...

We study the influence of systematic probability misestimation on complexfinancial investment decisions on the context of structured financialproducts. Structured products have in recent years become more and morecomplex. We study the question whether this complexity might be a...

Internal inconsistencies are so commonplace in studies using the contingent valuation method(CVM) that it has been argued that that method should be abandoned as a means of preferenceelicitation in favour of other methods such as standard gambles (SG). The experiment described inthis paper finds...

Empirical research documents that temporary trends in stock pricemovements exist. Moreover, riding a trend can be a profitable investment strategy. (...)

This paper shows that a principal's distrust in the voluntary performanceof an agent has a negative impact on the agent's motivation to perform well.

For decades economists have considered money illusion aslargely irrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion haspowerful effects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs innominal terms almost all subjects play at or close to an inefficientequilibrium whereas if we lift the...

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and...