This paper deals with the introduction of stock options in an (dy-namically) incomplete securities market.

This paper establishes the result that the seller prefers posted-price selling when the cost of information acquisition is high, and auctions when it is low. We view corporate bonds as an instance of the former case, and government bonds as an instance of the latter.

(...) We provide support for the disposition effect. Participants who experience a gain sell their assets more rapidly than participants who experience a loss, and positively framed subjects generally sell their assets later than negatively framed subjects.

This paper analyzes a procurement setting with identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction. The reason is that holding an auction may leave...

I compare an auction and a tournament in a procurement setting where a noncontractible signal about the quality that each firm is able to supply is observed by the procurer and all competing firms. Signals are affected by firms noncontractibleinvestments in R&D and the procurers precision of...

Among the most puzzling observations for the euro money market are the bid shading in the weekly refinancing operations and the development of interest rate spreads. To explain these observations, we considera standard divisible-good auction à la Klemperer and Meyer (1989) with uniform or...

When information is costly, a seller may wish to prevent prospective buyers from acquiring information, for the cost of information acquisition is ultimately borne by the seller. A seller can achieve the desired prevention of information acquisition through posted-price selling, by offering...

A unique indivisible commodity with an unknown common value is owned bygroup of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while compensating theothers monetarily. We study the so-called fair division game (Güth, Ivanova-Stenzel,Königstein, and Strobel (2002, 2005)) theoretically and...

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits withoutenforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking andrather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it.[...]

A model of English auction that allows jump bidding is proposed. When twoobjects are sold separately via such English auctions, I construct an equilibrium suchthat bidders signal via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the priceswithout relying on any central mediator. This...