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On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement

Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel characterization of the equilibrium concept (Peleg and Tijs, 1996). But (together with non-emptiness) they preclude refinements of the equilibrium notion and selection of a unique equlibrium (norde et...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866983

Reputationsmechanismen auf Internet-Marktplattformen - Theorie und Empirie

Ockenfels, Axel - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Spieltheoretische Überlegungen zeigen, dass Reputationsmechanismen, wie sie auf Internet-Marktplattformen zur Anwendung kommen, prinzipiell geignet sind, Handel in großen anonymen Märkten zu erleichtern. Dies geil selbst dann, wenn die Marktteilnehmer ihre Identität jederzeit und kostenlos...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866985

Incentive Contracts versus Trust in Three-Person Ultimatum Games- An Experimental Study

Büchner, Susanne; Gonzalez, Luis; Güth, Werner; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

Whether incentive contracts perform better than trust in terms of productiveefficiency is usually explored by principal-agent experiments (mostinvolving only one agent). We investigate this issue in the context of athree-person ultimatum experiment, which is simpler and more neutrallyframed than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867038

Der Einfluss von Kostenabweichungen auf das Nash-Gleichgewicht in einem nicht-kooperativen Disponenten-Controller-Spiel

Fandel, Günter; Trockel, Jan - Fernuniversität <Hagen> / Fakultät für … - 2008

Für Industrieunternehmen ist es wichtig, ihre Bestellmengen zu optimieren. Sie wirken sich auf Lagerhaltung und Beschaffung aus und beeinflussen Servicegrad und Produktionsbereitschaft. Fehlerhaft bestimmte Losgrößen führen zu höheren Kosten und Gewinneinbußen.[...] Die Interaktion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868276

Stockkeeping and controlling under game theoretic aspects

Fandel, Günter; Trockel, Jan - Fernuniversität <Hagen> / Fakultät für … - 2008

approach of game theory and it can be analysed in view of decision theory. This is thecentral object of this article. The … minimize the costs of capital commitment. This decision conflict – based on lateral perception –can be modelled using an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868282

Game Theory and InternationalEnvironmental Cooperation:Any Practical Application?

Finus, Michael - Fernuniversität <Hagen> / Fakultät für … - 2000

Many researchers have found game theory a useful method for analyzing internationalenvironmental problems. However …, game theory has been criticized for being too theoretical,abstracting from too many practical problems and being based on … welfare distributionsand to enforce an IEA. Chapter 4 discusses policy instruments in global pollution control andchapter 5 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868366

WEAK LINKS, GOOD SHOTS AND OTHER PUBLICGOOD GAMES: BUILDING ON BBV

Cornes, Richard; Hartley, Roger E. - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics; … - 2006

We suggest an alternative way of analyzing the canonical Bergstrom-Blume-Varian model of non-cooperative voluntary contributions to a public goodthat avoids the proliferation of dimensions as the number of players is in-creased. We exploit this approach to analyze models in which the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868656

Shapley compensation scheme

Dehez, Pierre - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics … - 2007

We study a particular class of cost sharing games – "data games" – covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868750

Hawks and doves in segmented markets:a formal approach to competitive aggressiveness

D’ Aspremont, Claude; Dos Santos Ferreira, Rodolphe; … - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics … - 2007

controlled by each firm through its managerhiring decision, in a preliminary stage of a delegation game. When competition is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868753

FINANCIAL PREDATION BY THE WEAK

Bougheas, Spiros; Saksit Thananittayaudom - University <Nottingham> / Department of Economics - 2005

We examine a Stackelberg game where a financially constrainedleader faces competition from a ‘deep pocket’ follower. We analyzethe consequences of this trade-off between a financial and a strategicadvantage for both the design of financial contracts and market structure.We derive conditions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005868761