Noncooperative games in which each player’s payo¤ function depends on anadditively separable function of every player’s choice variable may be transformedinto an aggregative game, which may be analysed using the conceptof ‘share functions’. The resulting approach avoids the...

We develop a simple labour turnover model of general training. Upon completion of theirtraining, apprentices are equipped with general skills and they accumulate firm-specificskills by continuing working for their training firm. Job turnover is associated with a loss ofaccumulated firm-specific...

Using parametric formulae under lognormality for a broad family of povertymeasures, we show that when inequality measured by the Gini coeffcient isconstant, dening the poverty line as a fraction of a central tendency of theliving standard distribution restricts the evolution of the poverty...

We consider the possibility of estimating a Dickey-Fuller regression, constraining the autoregressive parameter to be at most one, and imposing prior knowledge of the sign of the drift parameter. ...

The rent-seeking model of Tullock (1980) has stimulated a large literature on rent-seekingcontests, of which Hillman (1989) and Nitzan (1994) provide useful surveys. AlthoughTullock's 'winner take all' model has been adapted and extended in numerous ways, thereremain fundamental modeling issues,...

Player i's payoff in a noncooperative game is generally expressed as a function of thevector of strategies of all players. However, in some games - 'simply reducible games' - thepayoff of player i is a function of two arguments - the strategy chosen by i, and the sum ofthe strategies of all...

Internal inconsistencies are so commonplace in studies using the contingent valuation method(CVM) that it has been argued that that method should be abandoned as a means of preferenceelicitation in favour of other methods such as standard gambles (SG). The experiment described inthis paper finds...

We explore the extension of James-Stein type estimators in a direction that enables them topreserve their superiority when the sample size goes to infinity. Instead of shrinking a base estimatortowards a fixed point, we shrink it towards a data-dependent point. We provide an analytic expression...

This note develops a method of recovering individual preferences, and of obtaining money-metricindividual welfare comparisons, from demand functions generated by Cournot-Nash equilibria ingames with public goods.