In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n _ 2)state-specic assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume andEasley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds accordingto the constant probabilities of the various states. The dierent...

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of a …-nancial market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assetspay dividends that are partially consumed and partially rein-vested. The traders use general, adaptive strategies (portfoliorules), distributing their wealth between...

The paper examines a game-theoretic model of a …nancial market inwhich asset prices are determined endogenously in terms of short-runequilibrium. Investors use general, adaptive strategies depending onthe exogenous states of the world and the observed history of thegame. The main goal is to...

The famous game of two cars is a pursuit-evasion dynamic game. In theextended version presented here, a correct driver (evader) on a freeway detectsa wrong-way driver (pursuer in a worst case scenario), i.e., a car driving on thewrong lanes of the road or in the wrong direction. The correct...

The paper examines a game-theoretic evolutionary model of anasset market with endogenous equilibrium asset prices. Assetspay dividends that are partially consumed and partially rein-vested. The investors use general, adaptive strategies (portfo-lio rules), distributing their wealth between...

We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decisionof the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude oneof two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responderacceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one ofthem, what increases the...

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individualsto voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, weuse an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in whichresponders can only accept or reject the o®er, and the other in which theycan also...

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifiesthe winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume thatcontestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizationsto the case where each...

The study of gender differences in social preferences has shown mixedresults, preventing economists and other social scientists from drawingdefinitive conclusions on this topic. Several original investigations andexperimental reviews have hypothesized that the main reason of this heterogeneityof...

In a market with stochastic demand at most one seller can acquire costly informationabout demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the marketdemand and the probability that an informed seller is trading in the market. Theseidiosyncratic beliefs co-evolve with the potential...