We consider a median voter model with uncertainty about how theeconomy functions. The distribution of income is exogenously given andthe provision of a public good is ¯nanced through a proportional tax.Voters and politicians do not know the true production function for thepublic good, but by...

Historical examples (ISDN, Teletex, telefax, telex) show us that forecasting efforts in the telecommunication sector can go awry - not only by a few percentage points but by large magnitudes. We maintain that with strong network effects it is not possible to forecast the success of...

As the link between tax compliance and tax morale is found to be robust,finding the determinants of tax morale can help to understand and fight taxevasion. In this paper we analyze the effect of progressive taxation on taxmorale in a cross-country approach - which has not been investigated...

As the link between tax compliance and tax morale is found to be robust, finding thedeterminants of tax morale can help to understand and fight tax evasion. In this paper weanalyze the effect of progressive taxation on tax morale in a cross-country approach – whichhas not been investigated...

This paper is the first to provide evidence of efficient taxation of groups with heterogeneouslevels of ‘tax morale’. We set up an optimal income tax model where high tax morale impliesa high subjective cost of evading taxes. The model predicts that ‘nice guys finish last’: groupswith...

Standard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This paper models wage rigidity and collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualised or collective wage...

Standard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This paper models wage rigidity and collective bargaining endogenously, when workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualized or collective wage...

This paper deals with two, potentially intertwined issues of stock exchangegovernance. First, we demonstrate in a static global games model that in-vestment propensity will vary across di®erent types of organizational formsand competition scenarios. Exchanges organized as mutuals are...