Investitionsneutrale Steuersysteme haben keinen Einfluss auf unternehmerische Investitionsentscheidungen. Diese Eigenschaft besitzen die Besteuerung des ökonomischen Gewinns, die Cashflow–Steuer und die zinsbereinigte Steuer. Von diesen drei Systemen weist die zinsbereinigte Steuer die...

This paper estimates the issuers' demand for the banker's underwriting service across different varieties of equity-linked securities.

This paper shows how this becomes an informational first-mover advantage that turns innovators into the market leader.

We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework whereparties are risk-neutral and the agent is ¯nancially constrained. Weshow that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining poweris analyzed in either of the following three frameworks; a standard P-Aframework by varying...

This paper surveys new research concerning bargaining within supply chains and its implications for buyer power. The paper explores the implications of the research on supermarket supply chains for primary, secondary and private-label branded goods. The empirical base in support of the theories...

This paper analyses the implications of bargaining between buyers and sellers on the competitive outcome in a homogeneous good industry. Bargaining creates a competitive equilibrium in which some inefficient sellers coexist with efficient leading to productivity dispersion...

List prices are not completely credible as take it or leave it prices: buyers are able to seek reductions by bargaining with firms. We show that this realisation leads to the existence of a critical threshold number of competitors in an industry which depends on fundamentals. In industries with...

Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token,...

We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decisionof the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude oneof two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responderacceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one ofthem, what increases the...

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individualsto voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, weuse an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in whichresponders can only accept or reject the o®er, and the other in which theycan also...