We consider a repeated stochastic coordination game with imperfect publicmonitoring. In the game any pattern of coordinated play is a perfectBayesian Nash equilibrium ...

A population of players is considered in which each player may select his neighbors in order to play a 2 × 2 coordination game with each of them. We analyze how the payoffs in the underlying coordination game effect the resulting equilibrium neighborhood resp. network structure.

In an experimental 2x2 coordination game with two strict equilibria we observe that, in contrast to equilibrium selection theory (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), only half of the subjects choose the strategy that relates to the payoff- and risk-dominant equilibrium. We propose modified risk dominance...

We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. If two-fund separation is found to hold across periods for competitive behavior, it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend on...

Based on an experimental analysis of a simple monetary economy we argue that a monetary system is more stable than one would expect from individual rationality. Weshow that positive reciprocity stabilizes the monetary system, provided everyparticipant considers accepting money as a reasonable...

This paper contributes to the micro-foundation of money in centralizedmarkets with idiosyncratic uncertainty. It shows existence of stationarymonetary equilibria and ensures that there is an optimum quantity ofmoney. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual be-havior in a...

We explain excess volatility, short-term momentum and long-term reversal of asset prices by a repeated game version of Keynes beauty contest. In every period the players can either place a buy or sell order on the asset market. The actual price movement is determined by average market orders and...

Each of several exchange partners is the monopoly owner of a specific commoditywhich she can share with others. It is optimal to keep the own endowment, but allwould gain by mutual gift exchange. Participants play the game repeatedly in constantgroups (partner design) and can establish stable...