Land is an essential but limited natural resource. We employ the concept of stocks to analysedriving forces for land-use conversion and to assess, whether the German political “30-hectares-goal” is feasible given the current institutional setting. In this paper major drivingforces for...

We analyze a dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model of grazingmanagement in semi-arid rangelands. The non-equilibrium ecosystem is driven bystochastic precipitation. A risk averse farmer chooses a grazing management strategyunder uncertainty such as to maximize expected utility from...

In January 2005 the EU-wide CO2 emissions trading system (EU-ETS) has formally entered into operation.Within the new trading system, the right to emit a particular amount of CO2 becomes a tradable commodity - called EU Allowances (EUAs) - and affected companies, traders and investors will face...

The EU Directive 2003/87/EC for the introduction of a European emission trading system has leftthe task of allocating the emission allowances mainly to the member states. In Germany the details of theallocation method are laid down in the Allocation Act (ZuG 2007). One central element of the...

Many researchers have found game theory a useful method for analyzing internationalenvironmental problems. However, game theory has been criticized for being too theoretical,abstracting from too many practical problems and being based on very specific assumptions.This article tries to qualify...

In an investment contest for environmental policy, polluters and victims ofpollution invest in an increase of their marginal benefits of pollution and environmentalquality, respectively. These investments influence time-consistent environmental policy...

We study environmental policy for a polluting firmthat can invest in extracapacity. The optimal levels of allowed output as well as the tax rate are increasingin investment. With divisible investment, commitment always leads to the first best,under direct regulation and taxation. Time-consistent...

We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&Dwith spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitiveR&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&Dsubsidy can be negative,...

This paper shows that although small or nancially constrained environmentalistgroups may be in a weak position, relative to polluting industries, in the directcompetition for political inuence, they can compete indirectly through changingpublic preferences over environmental quality. However, in...