Showing 1 - 10 of 37
In the experiment two bureaucrats independently can grant a permit with the profit of the private party depending on when the permit is given. Whereas one bureaucrat can only veto the project, the second one has additional discretion in granting the permit earlier or later. (...)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845212
We examine merger activity and its effect on asset pricing in a firm network economy. Mergers create internal capital markets which change the cash flow risk structure of the merging firms. We propose a solution concept for coalitional games without the superadditivity axiom, which extends...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858047
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022173
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by out-comes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, whereprocedures are dened independently of an outcome. To that end, wedesign procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry thesame information on other's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022177
Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248900
This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik(1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each …rm proposes how muchit is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker alsoproposes which salary she is willing to accept from each …rm if they arematched. The matchmaker...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302542
Markets sometimes unravel, with offers becoming inefficiently early. Often this is attributedto competition arising from an imbalance of demand and supply, typically excess demand forworkers. However this presents a puzzle, since unraveling can only occur when firms are willingto make early...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302545
We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse foruniversity admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists ofthree procedures based on final grades from school ("Abiturbestenverfahren","Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen") and on waiting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860493
This paper addresses the key determinants of merger failure, in particularthe role of innovation (post-merger performance) and technology (ex-anteselection) when firms decide to separate. After a brief review of the existingliterature we introduce a model of process innovation where merged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860566
We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school (“Abiturbestenverfahren”, “Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen”) and on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860763