This chapter develops a unified analytical framework, drawing on and extending the existing literatureon the subject, for studying the role of property rights in economic development. Itaddresses two fundamental and related questions concerning the relationship between propertyrights and...

In order to understand inefficient institutions, one needs to understand what mightcause the breakdown of a political version of the Coase Theorem. This paper considersan environment populated by ex-ante identical agents and develops a model of powerand distribution where institutions (the...

This article investigates economic performance when enforceable propertyrights are missing and basic needs matter for consumption. It suggests anew view of the so-called voracity eect according to which windfall gains inproductivity induce behavior that leads to lower economic growth. Takinginto...

This paper introduces wealth-dependent time preference into a simplemodel of endogenous growth. The model generates adjustment dynamics in linewith the historical facts on savings and economic growth in Europe from the HighMiddle Ages to today. Along a virtuous cycle of development more wealth...

This paper presents an account of the environment faced by entrepreneurs in Russia. Insection one we give a brief introduction to the country which is followed by theoverview of a public policy on small and medium enterprises in the next section. Thecurrent state of SMEs and some particularities...

This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state...

In the experiment two bureaucrats independently can grant a permit with the profit of the private party depending on when the permit is given. Whereas one bureaucrat can only veto the project, the second one has additional discretion in granting the permit earlier or later. (...)

This paper analyses how tax morale and countries´ institutional quality affect the shadoweconomy, controlling in a multivariate analysis for a variety of potential factors. The literaturestrongly emphasizes the quantitative importance of these factors to understand the level andchanges of...

This paper analyses how governance or institutional quality and tax morale affect the shadoweconomy, using an international country panel and also within country data...

Die Governance der Zentralbanken hat zwei Dimensionen: Corporate Governance und Public Governance. Public Governance ist ein institutioneller Rahmen, wobei die breite Öffentlichkeit eine Zentralbank regelt durch und durch die Legislative und Exekutive in einem Land. Dieses Papier argumentiert,...