Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a...

In experimental bargaining with incomplete information, we vary the information distribution (symmetric and asymmetric), the direction of electronic prepaycommunication (no, one-way, and two way), and the electronic communication medium (email and video) Bargainig outcomes are influenced by the...

Among the most puzzling observations for the euro money market are the bid shading in the weekly refinancing operations and the development of interest rate spreads. To explain these observations, we considera standard divisible-good auction à la Klemperer and Meyer (1989) with uniform or...

Despite their theoretical efficiency in selling shares to the public, auctions are not thepreferred mechanisms of issuers in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). Chemmanur and Liu(2006) [WP] and Sherman (2005) [JFE 78, 615-649] provide a rational explanation for this“IPO auction puzzle”. They...

Kapital- und Opportunitätskosten sind Maße für die Verzinsung, die eine Investition mindestens erwirtschaften muß, um vorteilhaft zu sein. Die Opportunitätskosten sind anzusetzen, wenn der Investor das Projekt durch eigene Mittel finanziert, die er alternativ am Kapitalmarkt anlegen...

Risiko liegt begründet in der unvollständigen Information über zukünftige Zustände. Das Phänomen des Risikos durchdringt praktisch alle Bereiche des menschlichen Lebens. Risiko berührt eine Vielzahl ökonomischer, politischer, sozialer und technologischer Fragestellungen und...