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House Allocation with Overlapping Agents: A DynamicMechanism Design Approach

Kurino, Morimitsu - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, inthe case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move inand graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A studentis a \newcomer" in the beginning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022173

Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Studyof Centralised University Admissions in Germany

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit <Bonn> - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860493

Telling the Truth May Not Pay Off: An Empirical Study of Centralised University Admissions in Germany

Braun, Sebastian; Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea - Sonderforschungsbereich Ökonomisches Risiko <Berlin> - 2007

We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in … criteria applied for admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is not a dominant … applicants, we are able to detect some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. Alternative ways to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005860763

Learning (Not) To Yield: An Experimental Study of Evolving Ultimatum Game Behavior

Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Hertwig, Ralph; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2010

Whether behavior converges toward rational play or fair play in repeated ultimatum games depends on which player yields first. If responders concede first by accepting low offers, proposers would not need to learn to offer more, and play would converge toward unequal sharing. By the same token,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009248900

Listen: I am angry!An experiment comparing ways of revealing emotions

Güth, Werner; Levati, Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

We report on an experiment designed to explore whether allowing individualsto voice their anger prevents costly punishment. For this sake, weuse an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in whichresponders can only accept or reject the o®er, and the other in which theycan also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866528

Social Learning of Efficiency Enhancing TradeWith(out) Market Entry Costs - An ExperimentalStudy

Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner; Vanberg, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

We investigate experimentally whether entry costs have an impact on the evolutionof cooperation in a social dilemma game. In particular, subjects repeatedly playthe so-called takeover game with anonymous partners randomly drawn from a fixedpopulation of participants. The game represents a social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866640

Information and Communication in Sequential Bargaining

Brosig, Jeannette; Ockenfels, Axel; Weimann, Joachim - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

In experimental bargaining with incomplete information, we vary the information distribution (symmetric and asymmetric), the direction of electronic prepaycommunication (no, one-way, and two way), and the electronic communication medium (email and video) Bargainig outcomes are influenced by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866968

From Ultimatum to Nash Bargaining: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Müller, Wieland - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2003

We examine the strategic behavior of first and second movers in a two party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. If the second mover is informed,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866971

Speeding up Bureaucrats by Greasing Them- An Experimental Study

Gonzalez, Luis; Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2002

In the experiment two bureaucrats independently can grant a permitwith the profit of the private party depending on when the permit is given.Whereas one bureaucrat can only veto the project, the second one hasadditional discretion in granting the permit earlier or later. We speakof greasing when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867100

Speeding up Bureaucrats by Greasing Them - An Experimental Study

González, Luis; Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria - 2002

In the experiment two bureaucrats independently can grant a permit with the profit of the private party depending on when the permit is given. Whereas one bureaucrat can only veto the project, the second one has additional discretion in granting the permit earlier or later. (...)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005845212

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