This paper examines the power of different contractual mechanisms to influence an originator’s choice of costly effort to screen borrowers when the originator plans to securitise its loans. The analysis focuses on three potential mechanisms: the originator holds a “vertical slice”, or...

Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirableactivity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability?When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction?This paper shows that any restriction of implementabilityis caused by an identification...

Die Arbeit untersucht die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen, wenn zwischendem Kreditverkäufer (Bank) und dem Kreditnehmer die Möglichkeit der Bildung einer zuLasten des Kreditkäufers gehenden vertikalen Kollusion besteht. Die Bank übernimmt nachder Veräußerung des Kredits...

This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance evaluationand in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence oftechnological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rivalry.1 It is further examined, whether the...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

This paper investigates whether recourse to a consultant always enhances decision making. Advice given by a consultant changes the manager’s belief about his own decision-making ability. This change in belief alters the manager’s incentives to make a decision. Taking into account this...

In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and respondercan share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a rewarddistribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). Thegames only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested...

This paper investigates the extent to which differences in information costs can explain the equity home bias puzzle. In a model where the cost of acquiring information regarding the Foreign asset is higher than for the Home asset, we show that–if cost functions are convex–the expected size of...

This paper investigates whether firms employing IAS or US GAAP exhibit measurable differences in proxies for information asymmetry and market liquidity. Sample firms are drawn from the "New Market" at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. All firms listed in this market segment are required to provide...