This note analyses investment and risk-taking in a simple agency model of public regulation/procurement borrowed from Laffont & Tirole (1993). We show that the principal will overinvest or underinvest depending on whether investment is marginally more productive in bad or in good states. Due to...

The absence or the presence of the resource curse is often explained by the specifics of politicaland institutional factors. The aim of this paper is to study this effect looking separately ateconomic and political institutions and at their interaction. Unlike most empirical papers inthe...

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading)and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structureare considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. The effect of combining the twoschemes is also...

Time consistency problems can arise when environmental taxes are employedto encourage firms to take irreversible abatement decisions. Setting a high carbontax, for instance, would induce firms to invest in low-carbon technology,yet once investment has occurred the government can then reduce the...

In der Literatur zur Abschlußprüfung ist ein negativer Effekt eines ökonomischen Vorteils aus der wiederholten Mandatsannahme, der aufgrund von Transaktionskosten entsteht, auf die Unabhängigkeit des Abschlußprüfers diskutiert worden. Anders als die bisher vorgestellten Ansätze wird im...