Die Arbeit untersucht die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen, wenn zwischendem Kreditverkäufer (Bank) und dem Kreditnehmer die Möglichkeit der Bildung einer zuLasten des Kreditkäufers gehenden vertikalen Kollusion besteht. Die Bank übernimmt nachder Veräußerung des Kredits...

A model is analyzed in which agents exert effort to create innovations within an organization. When payments are infeasible, the decision on the implementation of a proposal is shown to bemadeby simplemonotonic decision rules. A trade-off arises between the use of information and the incentives...

A theory of responsibility is provided in a simple model where agents care for their career prospects. First, two agents with uncertain abilities work on a task. Second, a principal decides to promote one of them. Three types of equilibria occur. One in which no agent is responsible for the task...

Empirical studies on information communication technologies (ICT) typically aggregate the“information” and “communication” components together. We show theoretically and empirically thatthese have very different effects on the empowerment of employees, and by extension on wageinequality....

Market share objectives are prominent in many industries, especially where man-agers pay much attention to league table rankings. This paper explores the strategicrationale for giving managers incentives based on market share in an oligopoly com-peting in strategic substitutes. Moreover, the...