Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirableactivity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability?When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction?This paper shows that any restriction of implementabilityis caused by an identification...

Die Arbeit untersucht die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen, wenn zwischendem Kreditverkäufer (Bank) und dem Kreditnehmer die Möglichkeit der Bildung einer zuLasten des Kreditkäufers gehenden vertikalen Kollusion besteht. Die Bank übernimmt nachder Veräußerung des Kredits...

This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance evaluationand in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence oftechnological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rivalry.1 It is further examined, whether the...

In this paper, we propose a model of credit rating agencies using the global gamesframework to incorporate information and coordination problems. We introduce arefined utility function of a credit rating agency that, additional to reputationmaximization, also embeds aspects of competition and...

This paper examines simple parimutuel betting games under asymmetric information,with particular attention to differences between markets in which bets are submittedsimultaneously versus sequentially. In the simultaneous parimutuel betting market, all(symmetric and asymmetric) Bayesian-Nash...

By allowing for imperfectly informed markets and the role of private information, we offer newinsights about observed deviations of portfolio concentrations in domestic relative to foreignrisky assets, or “home bias”, from what standard finance models predict. Our model ascribesthe...

We investigate a team setting in which workers have different degrees of commitment to theoutcome of their work. We show that if there are complementarities in production and if theteam manager has some information about team members, interventions that the managerundertakes in order to assure...

Empirical and experimental papers nd that high-powered incentives may re-duce performance rather than improve it; a phenomenon referred to as "chokingunder pressure". We show that competition for high ability workers neverthelessleads rms to oer high bonus payments, thereby deliberately...