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Rieger, Marc Oliver - Institut für Schweizerisches Bankwesen <Zürich> - 2006

We study how the framework of classical game theory changes when the preferences of the players are described by Prospect Theory instead of Expected Utility Theory. Specifically, we study the influence of framing effect and probability weighting on the existence and specific structure of Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858351

INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES IN A STRATEGICSETTING: THE 3-POINTS-FOR-A-WIN SYSTEM INSOCCER

Moschini, GianCarlo - Iowa State University of Science and Technology <Ames, … - 2008

I exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact ofincentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game-theoretic model is developed thatcaptures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis-à-vis the number of points awardedto a win. The observable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009360784

On the Absorbability of the Guessing Game Theory -A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Morone, Andrea; Sandri, Serena; Uske, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2006

Theory absorption, a notion introduced by Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1972)and further elaborated by Güth and Kliemt (2004), discusses the problem whether atheory can survive its own acceptance. Whereas this holds for strategic equilibria accordingto the assumptions on which they are based,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866646

When Uncertainty Blows in the Orchard: Comovementand the Equilibrium Volatility Risk Premia

Buraschi, Andrea; Trojani, Fabio; Vedolin, Andrea - Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research North … - 2010

equilibriumvolatility and correlation risk premia. In our economy, uncertainty is linked to both firm-specific and market-wide signals …: Greatersubjective uncertainty or higher disagreement on the market-wide signal imply a larger correlation of beliefs, a strongerco …-movement of stock returns, and a substantial correlation risk premium generated by the endogenous optimal risksharingamong …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009305103

Reputation und wiederholte Spiele

Rau-Bredow, Hans - 1996

Reputation bildet eine wichtige Vorraussetzung für das Funktionierende des alltäglichen Wirtschaftslebens.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005851003

Internalizing Externalities of Loss-Prevention through Insurance Monopoly: An Analysis of Interdependent Consumer Risks

Hofmann, Annette - 2005

When risks are interdependent, an agent's decision to self-protect affects the loss probabilities faced by others. Due to these externalities, economic agents invest too little in prevention relative to the socially efficient level by ignoring marginal external costs or benefits conferred on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005856262

Do Factor Shares Reflect Technology?

Bental, Benjamin; Demougin, Dominique - 2005

This note demonstrates that it is easily possible to compute technological parameters out of national income accounting data in the presence of bargaining in the labor market. Applying the method to US data, we obtain that the output elasticity with respect to capital exceed 0.5.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858016

Faulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies withSingle-peaked Preferences

Doghmi, Ahmed; Ziad, Abderrahmane - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2009

In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerantimplementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of thek-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022175

Pro t-Maximizing Matchmaker

Yu Ko, Chiu; Konishi, Hideo - Boston College / Department of Economics - 2009

This paper considers a matchmaker game in the Shapley-Shubik(1971) (one-to-one) assignment problem. Each rm proposes how muchit is willing to pay each worker if they are matched. Each worker alsoproposes which salary she is willing to accept from each rm if they arematched. The matchmaker...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302542

Skill Mismatch in Equilibrium Unemployment

Bachmann, Ronald - Sonderforschungsbereich Ökonomisches Risiko <Berlin> - 2005

We analyse the effect of skill mismatch in a search model of equilibrium unemployment with risk-neutral agents, endogenous job destruction, and two-sidedex-ante heterogeneity. First, we examine the interaction of labour market institutions and skill mismatch. We find that skill mismatch changes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005861985

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