In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter intodynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimalterminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the workerwho is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and...

What determines the firm's choice of its mechanism of investment financing? How is the choice of the firm's financing mechanism at the micro level related to the economy's business cycle movements at the aggregate level? This paper develops a model of the credit market where the equilibrium...

How important is financial development for economic development? A costly state verification modelof financial intermediation is presented to address this question. The model is calibrated to match factsabout the U.S. economy, such as intermediation spreads and the firm-size distribution for the...

How does technological progress in financial intermediation affect the economy? To address this questiona costly-state verification framework is embedded into a standard growth model. In particular, financialintermediaries can invest resources to monitor the returns earned by firms. The...

In a dynamic model of the labor market with moral hazard, equilibriumlayoff is modeled as termination of an optimal long-term contract. Termination,together with compensation (current and future), is used as an incentive deviceto induce worker efforts. I then use the model to study analytically...