The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividendof each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weightsfor all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividendsproportionally to their weights. In this...

We study a particular class of cost sharing games – "data games" – covering situations wheresome players own data which are useful for a project pursued by the set of all players. Theproblem is to set up compensations between players. Data games are subadditive butgenerally not concave, and...

Ordinarily, the process of decision making by a committee through voting is mod-elled by a monotonic game the range of whose characteristic function is restricted tof0; 1g: The decision rule that governs the collective action of a voting body induces ahierarchy in the set of players in terms of...

The variable threat-bargaining model of Nash (1953) assumes that threats in the senseof binding commitments as to what one will do if bargaining ends in conflict, are chosenbefore bargaining. By comparison, late threats to be chosen after bargaining end in conflict,appear more natural and would...

Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. Increasingly,they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique)bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize,bidding cost and...

The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since thenseveral axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed tocost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a...

The paper examines the Porter and induced-innovation hypotheses in a firm model where: (i) the firmhas a vintage capital technology with two complementary factors, energy and capital ; (ii) scrappingis endogenous; (iii) technological progress is energy-saving and endogenous through purposive...

Russian natural gas is delivered to Western Europe by pipelines, running throughUkraine, Poland and other transit countries. We derive the bargaining power of thedifferent players along this supply chain endogenously from the architecture of thetransmission system and its possible extensions by...

We develop a dynamic model of strategic investment in the Eurasian transport system fornatural gas. In the absence of international contract enforcement, countries may distortinvestment in order to increase their bargaining power, resulting in underinvestment incheap and/or overinvestment in...

We analyze how investment into the pipeline system supplying Russian natural gas to WesternEurope is distorted for strategic reasons. We use a two stage multilateral bargaining game amongheterogenous players, some lacking the ability to make long-term commitments. At the first stagethe players...