This article analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is nonverifiable. The tasks can beassigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an...

This paper analyzes optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for three tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. Assigning an...

We use a static framework characterized by both moral hazard and holdup problems. In the model the optimal allocation of bargaining power balances these frictions. We examine the impact of improved monitoring on that optimal allocation and its impact upon effort, investment, profits and rents....

This research is the outcome of fieldwork undertaken between November 2002 and 2003 inAl Gharaza village part of Khartoum State - the Sudan capital.The study focuses on identifying how spaces and times are interrelated and engendered. Theforces that impact the creation of boundaries or those...