This paper analyzes the interaction between financial leverage and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model of takeovers in which the financing strategies of bidding firms and the timing and terms of takeovers are jointly determined. In the paper, capital structure plays the role of a...

I show that ownership by blockholding and board composition is an important determinant ofcorporate debt maturity structure. Using GMM methodology to control for the potential endogeneityof all regressors, I find a statistically and economically significant negative relation between...

Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliatedfirms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions ofmissing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate thisby setting up a model where firms within the business group are connectedto...

Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die Ausgestaltung der Desinvestition einer Konzerneinheit im Rahmen eines Buy Out an institutionelle Private-Equity-Investoren. Der Arbeitskreis Finanzierung der Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft hat dafür eine explorative empirischeUntersuchung von 33...

Bank intermediated finance has been cited frequently as the preferred means for channeling funds from savers to firms. Germany is the prototypical economy where universal banks allegedly exert substantial influence over firms. Despite frequent assertions about the considerable power of German...

Der Beitrag analysiert die Kapitalstrukturpolitik der größten börsennotierten Unternehmenin Deutschland unter Berücksichtigung des Einflusses sowohl ihrer Kapitalgeberals auch der Informationsintermediäre Finanzanalysten und Rating-Agenturen.Der Arbeitskreis hat dazu eine explorative...

Building on the ‘law and economics’ literature, this paper analyses corporategovernance implications of debt financing in an environment where a dominant owner isable to extract ex ante ‘private benefits of control’. Ownership concentration may result inlower efficiency, measured as a...

This paper develops a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which optimal contracts resemble a combination of debt and equity. When defaulting on debt, the firm is punished by disruption of external funding. Such contracts however, invite rivals to compete more aggressively to...

The current EU rules governing the solvency of insurance companies essentially base the required minimum equity capital on the volume of insurance business the companies write. Thus, no attempt is made to identify or quantify the central risks borne by insurance companies. In response to...

This paper analyzes the determinants of the capital structure for a panel of 106 Swiss companies listed in the Swiss stock exchange.