We analyze market dynamics under Bertrand duopoly competition in industries with network effects and consumer switching costs. Consumers form installed bases, repeatedly buy the products, and differ with respect to their switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network...

Firms protected by antidumping measures do not unequivocally benefit from them. Antidumpingprotection benefits non-exporters active on the protected market by raising their domestic sales, buthurts exporters of similar products as the protected ones. Export sales of protected firms fall byalmost...

We analyze the relationship between Antidumping (AD) Protection and the productivity ofEU domestic firms in import-competing industries. For this purpose we identify a panel ofdomestic firms between 1993 and 2003 that at some point during this period are affected byAD initiations. Using a...

This paper analyses how competition over rebates for customer loyalty across product lines affects firms` pricing and consumers generally. If buyers incur firm specific costs or have shop specific tastes then competitive loyalty discounts lower consumer surplus overall and raise profits - the...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspectiongame. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legallyor illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibriumin mixed strategies. We...

We compare the advertising intensity and content of programming in a market withcompeting media platforms. With pay-tv, media platforms have two sources of revenues,advertising revenues and revenues from viewers. With free-to-air, media platformsreceive all revenues from advertising. We show...

We consider the plant location decision of a multinational, which has the option to invest in a more or aless technologically advanced country. We find that in the absence of exporting by the local firms, themultinational will invest in the country lagging behind, unless the firms in that...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

The common prior assumption justifies private beliefs as posterior probabilities when updatinga common prior based on individual information. Common priors are pervasive in most economicmodels of incomplete information and oligopoly models with asymmetrically informed firms. Wedispose of the...

The common prior assumption asserts that the beliefs of agents in different states of theworld are their posteriors based on a common prior and possibly some private signal. Commonpriors are pervasive in most economic models of incomplete information, oligopoly models withasymmetrically informed...