This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state...

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifiesthe winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume thatcontestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizationsto the case where each...

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) whichspecifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametricfamilies of CSF’s. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends onthe investments and a vector of...

The aim of the paper is to study the relation between the demand for human rights and foreconomic prosperity. It analyzes the demand not, as it is often done in the literature, from the“voice” perspective (political activity), but rather looks at the “exit” perspective...

... Die vorliegende Arbeit stützt sich deshalb auf eine institutionell bedingte Veränderung derBeteiligung, die Einführung des Frauenstimmrechts, um den Effekt einer kontrolliertenAusweitung des Elektorats auf die Staatsausgaben zu untersuchen. Das institutionelle Labor Schweiz erlaubt dabei...

We often observe minority ethnic groups at a disadvantage relative to the majority. Why is this and what can be done about it? Efforts made to assimilate, and time, are two elements working to bring the minority into line with the majority. A third element, the degree to which the majority...

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems — such as those relating to the useof common property resources or the provision of local public goods — is a key determinant ofeconomic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problemsin developing...

A key issue in the debate over gun control is how it will affectthe relative incentives of criminals and law-abiding citizens to acquireguns. We propose a simple model of interaction of criminals and law-abiding citizens as a contest where the parties arm themselves in orderto improve their...

Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits withoutenforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking andrather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it.[...]