Die Debatte über die optimale Ausgestaltung der Alterssicherung wird in jüngster Zeit äußerst kontrovers und hitzig geführt. Dabei scheint uns ein zentraler Aspekt nicht genügend beachte zu werden: Welcher Zusammenhang besteht zwischen den Merkmalen des Finanzsystems und des...

This paper discusses whether, in which respects, and to what extent the corporate governancesystems of Germany, the United Kingdom and France have already converged in the course ofEuropean economic integration, or are likely to converge in the foreseeable future. Wepresent, and attempt to...

This paper presents some consequences of economic theory for the regulation of corporate accounting and disclosure under Geman accounting legislation (de lege lata) and in an international context. The following implications are discussed: (i) It is argued that the economic income conception...

We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First,...

It is the objective of this paper to determine the voting premium for French shares by comparing the values of voting and non-voting shares, and to analyze the value of the voting rights. The study uses data for 25 French companies which had both types of shares outstanding and traded on the...

This paper deals with the impact of insider trading legislation on corporate governance.

This paper shows the advantages of staged investments for venture capitalists.

The literature is divided in its opinion about the impact of concentration of ownership on firmperformance. On the one hand, concentration of ownership that, in turn, concentratesmanagement control in the hands of a strategic investor, eliminates agency problemsassociated with dispersed...

Some investment advisors offer multiple versions of a fund with the same manager and highlycorrelated returns. But these “twin” funds are separate portfolios for different investors withdiffering abilities to select and monitor managers. Using a matched sample of retail andinstitutional twin...

We study changes in the design of CEO contracts when firms transition from being public with dispersedshareholders to having strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. These principals redesignsome, but far from all, contract characteristics. There is no evidence that they reduce...