In recent years, the performance-based approach to contracting for medical services has been gaining popu-larity across different healthcare delivery systems, both in the US (under the name of "Pay-for-Performance",or P4P), and abroad ("Payment-by-Results", or PbR, in the UK). One common element...

Research infrastructures (RIs) are the most powerful means to foster cooperation on a pan-European scale and to provide efficient access to advanced methods and technologies for the scientific community.The existence, availability and easy access to leading research infrastructures is a key...

This lecture is a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideasare fleshed out in a book Natural Justice, which is itself a condensed versionof an earlier two-volume book Game Theory and the Social Contract (Binmore[14, 12, 13])...

This paper examines finite parimutuel betting games with asymmetric information, with particular attention to differences between sequential and simultaneous settings, and betweenfully rational and myopic ("price taking") behavior. In the simultaneous parimutuel market,all (symmetric and...

Taking seriously the philosophical foundations of classical strategic theories of choice-making we scrutinize to what extent planning on on equilibrium strategies can be justified "eductively" among rational players and how this can be utilized to analyze games by their "game-like"...

Consistency and optimality together with converse consistency provide an illuminating and novel characterization of the equilibrium concept (Peleg and Tijs, 1996). But (together with non-emptiness) they preclude refinements of the equilibrium notion and selection of a unique equlibrium (norde et...

What we now label as "fair behavior" often differs from philopsophical norions of the concept. Establishing a clear understanding of the empirical nature of fairness is important if we are to gauge teh impact fairness has on economic and political institutions.[...]

The variable threat-bargaining model of Nash (1953) assumes that threats in the senseof binding commitments as to what one will do if bargaining ends in conflict, are chosenbefore bargaining. By comparison, late threats to be chosen after bargaining end in conflict,appear more natural and would...

We test for behavioral differences between groups and individuals in gift-exchange experiments. Related studies establish group behavior as typically closer to the game-theoretic equilibrium. We show that this result my depend crucially on the decision making procedure within groups. A novel...

Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with private values in which feedback onthe losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback isnot given. Furthermore, bids tend to be above the equilibrium predictions for riskneutral bidders. While the latter...