Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts.

Seit zwanzig Jahren befaßt sich die Finanzmarktforschung einerseits mit Fragen der Bewertung und des Managements von Finanztiteln auf effizienten Kapitalmärkten und mit Fragen der Managementkontrolle auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Der folgende selektive Überblick konzentriert sich auf zentrale...

In this paper, we use a unique hand-collected dataset to analyze stock listing as an entrepreneurial decision. By comparing mainland Chinese entrepreneurial firmslisted in Hong Kong with the same type of firms opting for a domestic listing on the Shenzhen second board market, we argue that the...

Although there has been an intensive debate on the relative merits of different sys-tems of corporate governance, empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance andfirm performance almost exclusively refers to the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon system. This papertherefore investigates...

Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts ...

Taking location as given, we study imperfect competition on a circular city. In Bertrandoligopoly, we identify price harmonics as a function of firm unit costs and locations. The sumof oligopoly profits is larger when costs and/or locations are more dispersed in the ‘dihedralmajorization’...

When adjustment costs are present, cyclical preference and technology heterogeneities in aproduct’s markets induce cycles in production. We exploit cyclic and dihedral groupinvariances in an industry’s cost technology to describe these patterns. We show whenequilibrium cyclical pricing and...

This paper investigates the financing conditions of non-financial corporations in theeuro area. We develop a new firm classification based on micro data by distinguishingbetween three groups of firms: unconstrained, relatively and absolutely constrainedfirms. We also provide further evidence on...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expectedto be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three noncompetingexplanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of boardmonitoring is hidden in stock price...

Based on a sample of 7,378 firms going public in the 1975-2005 period, we document a significant underperformance of IPO firms over the first year after going public, while there is virtually no underperformance thereafter. Moreover, by decomposing the Carhart-alpha we find that IPO...