Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts.

Seit zwanzig Jahren befaßt sich die Finanzmarktforschung einerseits mit Fragen der Bewertung und des Managements von Finanztiteln auf effizienten Kapitalmärkten und mit Fragen der Managementkontrolle auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Der folgende selektive Überblick konzentriert sich auf zentrale...

In this paper, we use a unique hand-collected dataset to analyze stock listing as an entrepreneurial decision. By comparing mainland Chinese entrepreneurial firmslisted in Hong Kong with the same type of firms opting for a domestic listing on the Shenzhen second board market, we argue that the...

Although there has been an intensive debate on the relative merits of different sys-tems of corporate governance, empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance andfirm performance almost exclusively refers to the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon system. This papertherefore investigates...

Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts ...

Taking location as given, we study imperfect competition on a circular city. In Bertrandoligopoly, we identify price harmonics as a function of firm unit costs and locations. The sumof oligopoly profits is larger when costs and/or locations are more dispersed in the ‘dihedralmajorization’...

When adjustment costs are present, cyclical preference and technology heterogeneities in aproduct’s markets induce cycles in production. We exploit cyclic and dihedral groupinvariances in an industry’s cost technology to describe these patterns. We show whenequilibrium cyclical pricing and...

Economic theory suggests that a commitment by a firm to increased levels of disclosure should lower the information asymmetry component of the firm’s cost of capital. But whi le the theory is compelling, so far empirical results relating increased levels of disclosure to measurable economic...

We investigate the suggested substitutive relation between executive compensation and the disciplinary threat of takeover imposed by the market for corporate control. We complement other empirical studies on managerial compensation and corporate control mechanisms in three distinct ways. First,...

This paper analyzes how agency problems in nancial contracting determine risk-taking andinvestment. In perfect capital markets a risk-neutral rm would invest until the expectedmarginal return equals the interest rate. However, as rms with little net-worth face agencycost in nancial contracting...