We present evidence on whether workers have social preferences by comparing workers’ productivityunder relative incentives, where individual effort imposes a negative externality on others,to their productivity under piece rates, where it does not. We find that the productivity of theaverage...

Extreme weather patterns are causing major damage on property and business and the question of who pays is becoming a serious issue. A law and economics point of view focuses on the problem that emitters of greenhouse gases externalize the true costs of their contribution to climate change...

Entrepreneuroal risk vs. risks related to the pursuit of the entrepreneurship; Clear distinction vs. uncertainties, D&O liability risks(BJR)...

Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants vetopower to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of biddingprocesses to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a“productive state”. At heart...

[...]This study shows that tourism did respond positively to the local public amenities built as part ofthe Vision Iowa program. County taxable retail sales rose by 0.9% for every 1% increase in expenditureson the projects. Because the State of Iowa taxes sales at 5% of each additional dollar of...

We present a general, dynamic model of within-season harvesting competition in a sherymanaged with individual transferable quotas. Markov-Perfect equilibrium harvesting andquota purchase strategies are derived using numerical collocation methods. Our approachallows direct examination of harvest...

This paper provides a systematic welfare-based approach to analyze the impact of non-tariffmeasures (NTMs) on trade and welfare in presence of market imperfections. We focus onstandard-like measures such as technical barriers and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.The approach overcomes the...

The core is reformulated to incorporate the externality typical in strategic formgames. Any coalition of players may deviate by trying to commit to a profile of actionsdifferent from a status quo. The outsiders of the coalition may take a coordinatedmeasure, incentive-feasibly for themselves, to...