Using manufacturing data for India, this paper studies the economic effects of legal amendments on two types of labor laws: employment protection and labor dispute resolution legislation. We find that laws that increase employment protection or the cost of labor disputes substantially reduce...

This paper establishes theoretical and empirical linkages between union wage setting and the structure of the wage distribution. Theoretically, we identify conditions under which a right-to-manage model implies compression of the wage distribution in the union sector relative to the nonunion...

Empirical observations show that education helps to protect against labor market risks. This is twofold: The higher educated face a higher expected wage income and a lower probability of being unemployed. Although this relationship has been analyzed in the literature broadly, several...

Collective bargaining in Germany takes place either at the industry level or at the firm level; collective bargaining coverage is much higher than union density; and not all employees in a covered firm are necessarily covered. This institutional setup suggests to explicitly distinguish union...

Using linked employer-employee data from the German Structure of Earnings Survey 2001,this paper provides a comprehensive picture of the wage structure in three wage-settingregimes prevalent in the German system of industrial relations...

An earlier study of wage agreements, reached in the Canadian unionized sector between1976-99, found that wage adjustment is characterized by downward nominal rigidity andsignificant spikes at zero. We extend this earlier approach to encompass the possibility ofreal as well as nominal wage...

We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decisionof the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude oneof two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responderacceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one ofthem, what increases the...

This paper analyzes the relation between the quality of the legal enforcement of loan contracts and the allocation of credit to households, both theoretically and empirically.

This paper analyzes the relation between the quality of the legal enforcement of loan contracts and the allocation of credit to households, both theoretically and empirically. We use a model of household credit market with secured debt contracts, where the judicial system affects the cost...

We exploit a controlled frameless laboratory experiment to study settlement negoti-ations and the plainti¤’s decision to raise a lawsuit in case of an impasse. We …nd thatgreater variance in court outcomes increases the litigation rate and lowers the settlementrate. This latter …nding goes...