The paper offers a new explanation for the widely observed use of redeemable and convertible preferred stock in venture capital finance. Redeemable and convertible preferred stocks can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow and control rights as a function of the state of nature, the...

Financial leverage increases the expected return on equity. We show that this leverage effect is not only irrelevant for shareholders' present wealth but also for the return on their invest-ments. This result is straightforward if we do not only look at the return on equity but at the return on...

This paper studies the incentives of German firms to voluntarily disclose cash flow statements over time. While cash flow statement are mandated under many GAAP regimes, its disclosure has not been mandatory in Germany until recently. Nevertheless, an increasing number of firms provides cash...

It is the objective of this paper to determine the voting premium for French shares by comparing the values of voting and non-voting shares, and to analyze the value of the voting rights. The study uses data for 25 French companies which had both types of shares outstanding and traded on the...

An underinvestment problem arises if an additional investment project with positive net presentvalue increases only the market value of debt, but not of equity. As a way out the shift ofthe additional investment project and possibly also other projects to a subsidiary is considered.From the...

Risk transfer between primary insurance and reinsurance companies today takes place against a backdrop of major changes in international insurance and financial markets. One of these changes is the trend for the two markets to converge. This trend manifests itself in a growing number of product...

This contribution discusses a number of ideas for using a shareholder value approach to the problems of risk-adjusted performance measurement and the issue of capital allocation. We demonstrate that, if shareholder value is to be consistently maximised, then not only the total amount of equity...

This paper develops a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which optimal contracts resemble a combination of debt and equity. When defaulting on debt, the firm is punished by disruption of external funding. Such contracts however, invite rivals to compete more aggressively to...

This paper deals with optimal financial contracts which simultaneously provide payincentives and impose constraints on managerial control.

This paper presents a theory of inititial public offerings based on the idea that the optimal ownership structure of a company changes over the life cycle of the firm. Insiders take the company public when they have lost the comparative advantage over outsiders in gathering information to...