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Foundations for Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Ahn, Toh-Kyeong - 2001

"Institutional approaches to social dilemmas have so far focused on how to create incentive structures that channel individuals' behavior into socially desirable outcomes assuming that everyone is selfish. However, the presumption of universal selfishness is not only empirically invalid but may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468335

Appropriation Externalities in the Commons: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Herr, Andrew - 1996

of the commons.' This dissertation combines the tools of game theory and experimental methods to gain a broader …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468337

Essays on Individual Behavior in Social Dilemma Environments: An Experimental Analysis

Dudley, Dean - 1993

"In this study, individual level behavior is investigated in the context of computer assisted voluntary contribution mechanism public good (VCM) provision experiments and common pool resource (CPR) appropriation experiments. Previous studies of these environments have concentrated on aggregate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468340

Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems from an Institutional Perspective

Anderies, John M.; Janssen, Marco A.; Ostrom, Elinor - 2004

"What makes social-ecological systems robust? In this paper we look at the institutional configurations that affect the interactions among resources, resource users, public infrastructure providers, and public infrastructures. We propose a framework that helps to identify potential...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468396

Costly Voting: Theoretical and Experimental Results on Commons Dilemmas in Spatial Committee Games

Wilson, Rick K.; Herzberg, Roberta; Elliott, Mark - 1993

"Our focus in this paper is with the transaction costs inherent in most decision making settings. We specifically investigate an "institution free" collective choice mechanism that includes costs to calling votes. A set of models show that under low costs (i.e., where no cost-induced equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468404

Who, What, When, Why: Resource Economics Before the Fall

Wiener, Jonathan B. - 1998

microeconomic theory to these fundamental questions about resource management practises 'before the fall'. The essential argument is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468425

Why Fairness? Facial Expressions, Evolutionary Psychology, and the Emergence of Fairness in Simple Bargaining Games

Eckel, Catherine; Wilson, Rick K. - 1999

"One of the successes in contemporary social science is the development and proliferation of game theory. For a wide … range of phenomena, game theory produces enormous insight into the strategic interaction of individuals. Its greatest power …, information aggregation or when confronting large-scale social dilemmas. However, as Ostrom (1998) reminds us, game theory also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468443

Common Property: What Is It, What Is It Good For, and What Makes It Work?

McKean, Margaret A. - 1995

"This paper is one of a series of analyses that represent the first wave of work being performed by IFRI's collaborators. Each author draws upon the training and instrument of the IFRI program to address their particular research questions. Given the early stage of IFRI's implementation, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468320

The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems

Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M. - 1987

Published as:"The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems," Rationality and Society 2(3), July 1990, 335-358."A large, multidisciplinary literature focuses on the problems occurring when multiple individuals concurrently use common-pool resources such as fisheries, grazing areas, airsheds, oil...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468380

Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experimental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology

Hoffman, Elizabeth; McCabe, Kevin; Smith, Vernon - 1995

collect more money from the experimenter than noncooperative game theory predicts. As we interpret it, subject behavior in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468384