In essay one, we examine nonlocalized competition in interest taxation between an arbitrary number of countries. Our focus is on the role of relative number of locked-in investors in asymmetric tax competition. We find that in equilibrium, small countries have advantages in tax competition. In...

This dissertation examines common value auctions in which bidder default is allowed. Contractual default on the part of bidders is commonly observed in many auction settings and yet has remained virtually unexplored in the literature. We develop a two bidder model of a common value auction with...

In Part I we develop a model of entry in which an entrant with private information about its production cost and cost of entry has an opportunity to trade in the stock of a single incumbent before entry. We assume an efficient stock market populated by risk-neutral liquidity sellers who randomly...

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze tacit collusion in infinitely repeated price-setting games with capacity constrained firms. The dissertation is comprised of three related essays. The first essay contributes to the literature on optimal penal codes in Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly...

Below are summaries for three essays that share a common theme: each studies a market characteristic that affects price and consumer welfare. The first essay uses experimental methods to test collusive predictions derived in the price-matching literature. Laboratory data demonstrate that...

This dissertation presents an attempt to integrate state-contingent labor and loan contracts in explaining the effects of firm's financial decisions on its employment level and analyzing the fluctuations of employment over the business cycle. As such we propose a model by incorporating...

The first essay examines the phenomenon of free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the Gilbert and Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria coexist, underinvestment can occur in...

The first three essays examine whether strategic precommitment to advertising investment by an established firm can prevent a new firm from entering a homogeneous-product market under various assumptions. In Essay 1, I consider the question under the assumption that (1) advertisements contain...

The first essay examines Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing systems by incorporating the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model from operations research into a product market duopoly. We consider a two-stage game in which firms first simultaneously decide whether or not to invest in setup cost...

Contests are economic or social interactions in which two or more players expend costly resources in order to win prize(s). The resources expended by players determine their probability of winning a prize. This dissertation investigates theoretical and experimental applications of Contest theory...