By the early 1990s employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) had become more prevalentin unionized firms than in nonunionized firms. However, little research has been devoted to examining the implications of ESOPs for collective bargaining. Ben-Ner and Jun (1996) model ESOPs as a buyout option for...

An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. To...

This dissertation examines two problems that may arise in matching problems.The first two chapters deal with auctions for multiple units where bidders exhibitexternalities. The third chapter links risk aversion and information to unraveling inlabor markets.Auctions can lead to efficient...

In the paper, we summarize the results of a project that was motivated by the expiration of the “High Density Rule,” which defined the slot controls employed at New York’s LaGuardia Airport for more than 30 years. The scope of the project included the analysis of several administrative...

A firm energy market for Colombia is presented. Firm energy—the ability to provideenergy in a dry period—is the product needed for reliability in Colombia’s hydrodominatedelectricity market. The firm energy market coordinates investment in newresources to assure that sufficient firm energy...

We present a simulation analysis of the proposed Colombian firm energy market. The mainpurpose of the simulation is to assess the risk to suppliers of participation in the market. We alsoare able to consider variations in the market design, and assess the impact of alternative...

Wholesale electricity markets are commonly organized around a spot energy market.Buyers and suppliers submit bids and offers for each hour and the market is cleared atthe price that balances supply and demand. Buyers with bids above the clearing pricepay that price, and suppliers with offers...

We argue that a capacity market is needed in most restructured electricitymarkets, and present a design that avoids problems found in the early capacitymarkets. The proposed market only rewards capacity that contributes toreliability as demonstrated by its performance during hours in which there...

We consider an extension of the classical secretary problem where a decision maker observes only the relative ranks of a sequence of up to N applicants, whose true values are i.i.d. U[0,1] random variables. Applicants arrive according to a homogeneous Poisson Process, and the decision maker...

Chapter 1: Efficient Design of an Auction with Discrete Bid Levels This paper studies one of auction design issues: the choice of bid levels. Full efficiency is generally unachievable with a discrete auction. Since there may be more than one bidder who submits the same bid, the auction cannot...