in a strong position. We show that bank-controlled firms will be opaque, while shareholder-run firms prefer more … transparency. We can predict a clustering of attributes: bank dominance, established firms with valuable investment, but also … equity-controlled firms. Finally, bank control may fail to keep firms less transparent as global trading volumes rise. …

in a strong position. We show that bank-controlled firms will be opaque, while shareholder-run firms prefer more … transparency. We can predict a clustering of attributes: bank dominance, established firms with valuable investment, but also … equity-controlled firms. Finally, bank control may fail to keep firms less transparent as global trading volumes rise. …

prefer more disclosure to maximize profitability when in a strong position. We show that bank-controlled firms will be opaque … with bank dominance: opaqueness, low variability of profits, slightly reduced average profits, uncertainty about assets in … place, and relatively high financing needs all should be observed jointly for bank controlled firms. …

between inside managers and outside investors. Stock price crash results from activities where accumulated bad information … hided by managers cannot be stockpiled anymore. Thus stock price crash risk is viewed as a proxy of information asymmetry …

uses two competing theories (i.e. agency and power theory) to providea fuller explanation of the subtleties of the pay … performance. As with previous studies on executive bonus pay this associationremains weak. By implication, power theory is not … compensation, as agency theory would predict; (3) cash bonuses encourageshort-term achievement, as predicted by power theory; (4 …