In a model with imperfect competition and multiple equilibria we show how an increase in the minimum wage can lead firms to reduce wages (and employment). We find some empirical support for this in the Card–Krueger minimum wage data.

We show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect...

In a sector in which oligopolistic firms face a sector-specific labour supply constraint, there may be no marketclearing wage. Instead, at some wages, there can be two equilibria, one with involuntary unemployment and one with unfilled vacancies.

We consider a multi-sector overlapping generations model with oligopolistic firms in the output markets and wage-setting trade unions in the labour markets. A coordination problem between firms creates multiple temporary equilibria which are either Walrasian or of the Keynesian unemployment...

We consider a labour market model of oligopsonistic wage competition and show that there is a holdup problem although workers do not have any bargaining power. When a firm invests more, it pays a higher wage in order to attract workers from competitors. Because workers participate in the returns...

Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are...

The introduction of firm size into labor search models raises the question how wages are set when average and marginal product differ. We develop and analyze an alternative to the existing bargaining framework: Firms compete for labor by publicly posting long–term contracts. In such a...

This paper studies the dynamic interaction between human capital accumulation and economic growth. Capital market imperfections and an indivisibility in human capital investment prevent poor agents from accumulating skills, the acquisition of which positively affects technological progress. More...

It is known that overlapping generations models with imperfectly competitive firms may exhibit a continuum of stationary equilibria. The reason of this indeterminacy is that different price expectation functions of consumers lead to different objective demand functions against which firms...

Should we interpret the contributions of Edward C. Prescott and his collaborators, especially Finn Kydland and Rajnish Mehra, to dynamic general equilibrium as just a mathematical restatement of pre-Keynesian business cycle theory in the language of Arrow and Debreu? This essay advances the...