We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and...

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any...

Søren Løvstad Christensen1, Mette Kjoelby1,2, Lars Ehlers31Health Technology Assessment and Health Services Research, Centre for Public Health, Central Denmark Region, Denmark; 2School of Public Health, Aarhus University, Denmark; 3Health Economics and Management, Aalborg University,...