My dissertation contributes to auction studies. It analyzes the bidding behavior in multi-round auctions. It is motivated by an interesting multi-round feature observed in the procurement auctions held by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT hereafter), which adopts secret reserve...

Why do some sellers auction their goods, while other sellers post a fixed price? My dissertation investigates this question using theoretical, empirical, and experimental methodologies. The first chapter takes the competitive structure of the market as given and examines how the probability that...

This dissertation studies the distributions of treatment effects in switching regimes models (SRMs). First, we propose a general class of SRMs and provide simple estimators of average treatment effects. Second, we establish sharp bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes and the...

This dissertation studies affiliation and entry in first-price auctions, accomplishing three goals. First, it develops a simple approach to test for affiliation among bidders' private information and applies the approach to the timber sales data in Oregon State. Second, it extends the affiliated...

My dissertation focuses on partial identification of the distribution function of treatment effects. When treatment effects are believed to be heterogeneous, policy evaluation often requires knowledge of the distribution function of potential treatment effects. This function cannot be...