This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emis-sions trading in a two-sector (clean and dirty) economy. We compare the welfare implica-tions of an absolute cap-and-trade scheme (permit trading) with a relative intensity-basedscheme (credit trading). We nd...

The universal theme of deregulation of the electricity industry is the dismantling of the exclusive franchise, opening up some segments of the industry to competition. Technological changes in generation have helped eliminate the perception that generation is a natural monopoly, but this change...

Title IV of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act initiated a historic experiment in incentive-based environmental regulation through the use of tradable allowances for emission of sulfur dioxide by electric generating facilities. To date, relatively little allowance trading has taken place;...

The 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) instituted a national program in tradable sulfur dioxide (SO2) emission permits, referred to as "emission allowances," in the U.S. electricity sector. This paper provides a survey and assessment of the SO2 allowance trading program with a focus on...

Using a simple analytical model incorporating benefits of a stock, costs of adjusting the stock, and uncertainty in costs, we uncover several important principles governing the choice of price-based policies (e.g., taxes) relative to quantity-based policies (e.g., tradable permits) for...

Emissions trading can be organized in several ways. In particular, private emissions trading can be organized as permit trading, or as credit trading. The schemes have a different impact on output with credit trading leading to a higher output level than permit trading. This paper analyzes what...

This paper presents a model of imperfect international competition. Within this framework, the optimal choice of national environmental policy instrument and international emissions trading scheme is discussed. The choice of national instrument is restricted to absolute and relative standards,...

Cap-and-trade programs have become widely accepted for the control of conventional air pollution in the United States. However, there is still no political consensus to use these programs to address greenhouse gases. Meanwhile, in the wake of the success of the U.S. SO2 and NOx trading programs,...

Rate-based emissions policies (like tradable performance standards) fix average emissions intensity, while cap-and-trade policies fix total emissions. This paper shows that unfettered trade between rate-based and cap-and-trade programs always raises combined emissions, except when product...

The choice of mechanism for allocating tradable emissions permits has important efficiency and distributional effects when tax and trade distortions are considered. We present different rules for allocating carbon allowances within sectors (lump-sum grandfathering, output-based allocation [OBA],...