This paper develops a framework to analyze the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization decisions of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the...

Economics

Economics

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our...

We study the determinants of vertical integration. We first derive a number of predictions regarding the relationship between technology intensity and vertical integration from a simple incomplete contracts model. Then, we investigate these predictions using plant-level data for the UK...

We study the employment and distributional effects of regulating (reducing) working time in a general equilibrium model with search-matching frictions. Job creation entails fixed costs, but existing jobs are subject to diminishing returns. We characterize the equilibrium in the de-regulated...

We study the evolution of sectoral employment and labor cost in eleven European countries in the last two decades. Our statistical approach consists in decomposing for country, industry and temporal effects. Virtual economies are constructed by filtering country effects. We find that sectoral...

We analyze the implications for the dynamics of capitalaccumulation of market power and endogenous demand elasticities, in anenvironment in which the latter are affected by the number of competitorsin each industry. In equilibrium the interest rate increases as capitalaccumulates, even though...

Why would two risk-average agents write a nominal contract? A possible answer is that for an agent who is subject to risks caused by price variability, a nominal contract that offers hedging against these risks may be optimal. This paper argues that nominal contracts may have a role in...

A General Equilibrium model of investment is constructed in which the pay-offs of firms depend on each other''s actions. It is shown that when these actions are unobservable but aggregate output is in the information set of the agents; it acts as a signal. The implication is that output will...