Allokationsverfahren zur Vergabe von Zutrittslizenzen an Marktneulinge differieren hinsichtlich mehrerer Aspekte. Einer davon ist die Veröffentlichung der vom Regulierer im Lizenzvergabeverfahren gesammelten Informationen. Der Autor untersucht den Einfluss der Informationsweitergabe auf die...

Als zentralem Bestandteil der internationalen Finanzarchitektur kommt dem Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) heutzutage immer öfter die Aufgabe zu, bei Verschuldungskrisen souveräner Staaten, insbesondere weit fortgeschrittener Schwellen- und Transformationsländer, als multilateraler...

This thesis contributes to the literature by providing new insights into the patterns and market implications of insider trading. The inferences presented here are based on the insider trading reports filed with the Polish Securities and Exchange Commission and the New Zealand Exchange. First,...

We analyze a model of Internet auctions. Sellers each offer one item of a heterogeneous good to bidders who have unit-demand preferences. Items are sold in second-price proxy auctions. We derive a perfect Bayesian (epsilon-) equilibrium. Our experimental findings support the theoretical results....

The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks (SVN) implies new economic and organizational challenges. This work provides an auction-based coordination mechanism that enables the allocation and pricing of service compositions in SVNs. The mechanism...

A great body of knowledge exists on the theory of auctions and competitive bidding that is of potential relevance to construction contract tendering. Most of this, however, contains assumptions – such as perfect information – that are unlikely to be tenable in practice. The aim, therefore,...

This paper studies the evolutionary stability of the unique Nash equilibrium of a first price sealed bid auction. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium is not asymptotically stable under payoff monotonic dynamics for arbitrary initial populations. In contrast, when the initial population...

Classical auction theory relies heavily on the assumption of perfectly rational bidders that play according to their Nash Equilibrium Strategies. An alternative model is developed in this Thesis. It develops a framework for analyzing evolutionary learning in repeated auctions - bidders'...

Because sequential auctions have permeated society more than ever, it is desirable for participants to have the optimal strategies beforehand. However, finding closed-form solutions to various sequential auction games is challenging. Current literature provides some answers for specific cases...

Die Arbeit präsentiert ein lineares Optimierungsverfahren, das Teilnehmern einer Workshopveranstaltung Plätze in Workshops zuteilt, basierend auf persönlichen Präferenzen.Diverse Nebenbedingungen werden dabei beachtet. In einer zweiten Stufe wird das Ergebnis weiter verbessert, indem private...