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Three Essays on Hedge Fund Fee Contracts, Managerial Incentives and Risk Taking Behaviors

Zhan, Gong - 2011

Essay OneUnder the principal-agent framework, we study and compare different compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to the symmetric performance fee structure....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468230

Three Essays on Hedge Fund Fee Structure, Return Smoothing and Gross Performance

Feng, Shuang - 2011

Hedge funds feature special compensation structure compared to traditional investments. Previous studies mainly focus on the provisions and incentive structure of hedge fund contract, such as 2/20, hurdle rates, and high-water mark. The first essay develops an algorithm to empirically estimate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468232

Venture Capital Financing with Staged Investment, AgencyConflicts and Asymmetric Beliefs

Giat, Yahel - 2005

We consider a risk averse entrepreneur who approaches a diversified venture capitalist (VC) for financing of a project with positive potential return. We develop several models that capture key features of the venture financing, including staged investment, VC oversight costs and agency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009475844

Why Do Investors React Negatively to Seasoned Equity Offerings?

Kim, E. Han - 2006

The average investor reaction is neutral to primary offerings by firms with managerial incentives closely tied to the shareholder value. Investors react negatively (1) when there are insufficient managerial ownership stakes to deter misuse of SEO proceeds and (2) when there are negative signals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009476931

Three Essays on Corporate Governance, Managerial Incentives, and Government Expenditures.

Xu, Xiaoyan - 2008

The first essay proposes potential benefits from monitoring as important determinants of institutional block holding, where the measures for monitoring benefits are identified from the information asymmetry problem. Using U.S. data, I find that firms’ agency problems attract large...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009476987

Managerial incentives, market power and bank risk taking

Haq, Mamiza; Pathan, Shams; Williams, Barry - 2010

We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive’...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009448755

Bankruptcy Risk and the Performance of Market-based Pollution Control Policies

Zhang, Wei - 2008

We study the impacts of bankruptcy risk on the performance of market-based pollution control policies. In chapter one, we concentrate on emissions trading markets. We find that firms that risk bankruptcy demand more permits than if they were financially secure. Thus, bankruptcy risk in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009468112

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY - THE MOST WIDESPREAD CORPORATE FORM

LEUCIUC, EUGENIA GABRIELA - 2020

In this article we have discussed several aspects as companies are concerned. Thus, we will focus in particular on the limited liability company, which can either be single-person or multi-person. We consider it appropriate to highlight the facilities granted to those students who wish to set up...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012244709

Bank leverage cycles

Nuño, Galo; Thomas, Carlos

We study the cyclical fluctuations of leverage and assets of financial intermediaries and GDP in the United States. Leverage and assets are several times more volatile than GDP, and experience larger fluctuations for unregulated (‘shadow’) intermediaries than for regulated ones. While the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012530385

Commitment issues in delegation process

Pham, Quan; Reid, Jason F.; McCullagh, Adrian; Dawson, … - 2008

Delegation is a powerful mechanism to provide flexible and dynamic access control decisions. Delegation is particularly … federation. Although many delegation schemes have been studied, current models do not seriously take into account the issue of … delegation commitment of the involved parties. In order to address this issue, this paper introduces a new mechanism to help …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009437840