, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining … solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on TU-bargaining games where they coincide. The fourth axiom is a … of Nash's IIA-axiom that together with the three standard axioms suffices to characterize the Nash bargaining solution …

bargaining games they lead to the Pareto efficient boundary and to the Nash solution, respectively, as sets of maximal elements …

counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two …-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash … solution. The results reconfirm the Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish the same …

axioms. The paper presents and justifies these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other bargaining … contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analogous to these three are in conflict with each other. In contrast, in the …

We develop a dynamic bargaining model in which a leading country endogenously decides whether to sequentially negotiate … free trade agreements with subsets of countries or engage in simultaneous multilateral bargaining with all countries at … once. We show how the structure of coalition externalities shapes the choice between sequential and multilateral bargaining …

This thesis consists of three related essays, which develop the framework to study multilateral bargaining and … in the Eurasian gas supply chain. The first analytical part of the thesis concerns multilateral bargaining Russia and … to create countervailing power. The second part of the thesis deals with multilateral bargaining and coalition formation …