We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms, a “decentralized bargaining” market, and a “centralized” market. It is shown that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of “unraveling” in which relatively high value traders...

The paper considers the consequences of competition between two widely used exchange mechanisms, a "decentralized bargaining" market, and a "centralized" market. In every period, members of a large heterogenous group of privately-informed traders who each wish to buy or sell one unit of some...

We demonstrate that personality has a systematic effect on strategic behavior. We focus on two personality traits: anxiousness and aggressiveness, and consider a 2-player entry game, where each player can guarantee a payoff by staying out, a higher payoff if she is the only player to enter, but...

We analyze credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker's (1990) analysis,...

We study a version of the standard Kyle (85) model with endogenous information acquisition and we find that equilibria exist with free entry in which speculators make positive profits. Moreover, these equilibria are robust.

In the light of the exponential growth of the Internet and World Wide Web, this paper describes, in some detail, existing agents and multiagents applications in the context of e-commerce, and suggests a research agenda for economists in response to these changes in technology and lifestyle....

With existing technology, it is already possible for personal agents to schedule meetings for their users, to write the small print of an agreement, and for agents to search the Internet for the cheapest price. But serious negotiation cranks the difficulty of the problem up several notches. In...

The experimental phenomenon known as ‘probability matching’ is often offered as evidence in support of adaptive learning models and against the idea that people maximise their expected utility. Recent interest in dynamic-based equilibrium theories means the term re-appears in Economics....

Auctions provide an efficient way of resolving one-to-many negotiations. This is particularly true for automated agents where delays and long communications carry negative externalities. A properly designed auction, tailored to the specific needs of the relevant multi-agent system, can...