We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by [MV07.a], and we exemplify them in the case of truly combinatorial auctions.We benchmark the combined performance (the sum of the auction's efficiency and revenue) of a truly combinatorial auction...

We put forward new benchmarks and solution concepts for Adversarial Mechanism Design, as defined by [MV07.a], and we exemplify them in the case of truly combinatorial auctions.We benchmark the combined performance (the sum of the auction's effciency and revenue)of a truly combinatorial auction...

Because of its devastating effects in auctions and other mechanisms, collusion is prohibited andlegally prosecuted. Yet, colluders have always existed, and may continue to exist. We thus raise the followingquestion for mechanism design:What desiderata are achievable, and by what type of...

Privacy and trust affect our everyday thinking and, in particular, the way we approach a concrete game. Accordingly, we hope that a rigorous treatment of privacy and trust will become integral part of mechanism design. As of now, the field has been very successful in finding many ingenious...