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14.661 Labor Economics I, Fall 2006
Pischke, Jorn-Steffen; Angrist, Joshua - 2006
Neoclassical analysis of the labor market and its institutions. A systematic development of the theory of labor supply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009432547
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Accounting Recognition, Moral Hazard, and Communication
Liang, Pierre Jinghong - 2000
Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multiperiod agency model. One is an accounting source which partially but credibly conveys the agent’s private information through accounting recognition. The other is an unverified communication by the agent (i.e., a self-report). In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009441137
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Internationale Verschuldungskrisen, die Kreditvergabepolitik des IWF und Schuldner-Moral-Hazard : eine Analyse aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht
Frech, Tim - 2005
dem IWF in diesen Szenarien zur Verfügung stehen, orientieren sich dabei an den in der Theorie zur Finanzintermediation …, especially in contract theory. After thoroughly summarizing the potential information asymmetries and negative incentives between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009471827
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The Demand for Specialty-Crop Insurance: Adverse Selection and Inefficiency
Richards, Timothy J.; Mischen, Pamela - 1998
The twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are often blamed for the lack of insurance for many fruits and vegetables. This paper develops an alternative method of testing for adverse selection that uses a two-stage approach to determine the effects of technical inefficiency on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009442641
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Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks? Response to Government Aid
Duchin, Ran - 2011
We study the effect of government assistance on bank risk taking. Using hand-collected data on bank applications for … government investment funds, we investigate the effect of both application approvals and denials. To distinguish banks? risk … banks approve riskier loans and shift investment portfolios toward riskier securities. However, this shift in risk occurs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009482955
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Anreize und Privatheit bei modernen Monitoring Technologien: das Beispiel der Kfz-Versicherungsvertr?ge
Filipova-Neumann, Lilia - 2008
. By means of the data collected in cars they can better estimate individual driving behavior and accident risk which … information asymmetries concerning individual risk this has positive efficiency effects. Simultaneously with the improvement of … reveal to the insurer information about their own risk type, when risk type is due to differences in immutable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009482327
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An Analysis of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit
Claudio, Lucarelli - 2006
Medicare has recently experienced the largest expansion of benefits since its in- ception: the inclusion of prescription drug coverage under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003. The policy debate has mainly focused on estimating the cost of implementing the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009438528
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Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit
Berndt, Antje; Gupta, Anurag - 2008
% per year on a risk-adjusted basis over the three-year period following the sale of their loan. Furthermore, they suffer a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009441128
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Determinants of Moral hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi
Simtowe, Franklin; Zeller, Manfred; Phiri, Alexander - 2006
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain the success of Joint Liability Lending (JLL) schemes in mitigating moral hazard, empirical studies are rare. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009442550
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COOPERATIVE FORMATION AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS
Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G. - 2003
with at-risk capital. We identify market environments where these incentives are necessary for firm survival and interpret …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009443081