In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounding the governance of PPPs is that...

In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analyzing and improvement of governance of socio-economics dynamic of agriculture....

In this paper we incorporate interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, Behavioral and Political Sciences), and suggest a framework for analyzing and improvement of governance of socio-economics dynamic of agriculture....

There has been a fundamental development in theory and understanding of market, private, collective and public organizations in recent years. This paper incorporates achievements of the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law,...

In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopting the incomplete contract approach, it is shown that partial privatization may well be the optimal ownership structure. While in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is usually...

In this introduction, we briefly overview the topics covered by the contributions included in this special issue which, from different angles, deal with the organization and governance of social economy enterprises. Three different approaches are taken by the contributions to the special issue:...

¿ Las Empresas Públicas funcionan en general con una menor eficiencia que sus equivalentes Privadas, como reza el tópico al respecto? Se trata de un lugar común utilizado profusamente como un axioma indiscutible, principalmente desde posiciones políticas conservadoras. Aunque también...

This study investigates the relationship between market transparency and economic welfare in a mixed duopoly in which a welfare-maximizing public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the private firm’s market share, consumer surplus, and welfare increase with...

Using data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, we test two interesting results that emerge from the theoretical model presented in Shleifer and Vishny (1994) that studies bargaining between politicians and managers of state-owned firms. Shleifer and Vishny's model suggests that firms with...

We develop a game-theoretical model to examine the implications of the introduction of a non-profit "public option" in the U.S. health insurance market, in which a continuum of heterogeneous consumers, each facing unknown medical expenditures and differing in their expectations of such...