In a dynamic model of moral hazard, competition can undermine prudent bank behavior. While capital-requirement regulation can induce prudent behavior, the policy yields Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Capital requirements reduce gambling incentives by putting bank equity at risk. However, they also...

Previous theories of financial market rationing focussed on a single market, either the credit or the equity market. An interesting question is whether credit and equity rationing are mutually compatible, and how they interact. We consider a model with two-dimensional asymmetric information,...

This paper examines a set of financial policies, called financial restraint, that address financial market stability and growth in an initial environment of low financial deepening. Unlike with financial repression, where the government extracts rents from the private sector, financial restraint...

This paper asks the question under what circumstances banks have incentives to increase the deposit collection, when the deposit market is not fully penetrated, i.e. when there is low financial depths. We compare outcomes under a perfectly competitive deposit market with outcomes under financial...

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemploymentinsurance with a pension program through an individual account, allowingworkers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumptionduring an unemployment episode and thus improving their search...