We propose a novel framework to gauge the credibility of central banks' commitment to an inflation-targeting regime. Our framework combines survey data on macroeconomic forecasts with high-frequency financial market data to understand how inflation targeting makes economic agents change their...

We consider a New Keynesian model with strategic monetary and fiscal interactions. The fiscal authority maximizes social welfare. Monetary policy is delegated to a central bank with an anti-inflation bias that suffers from a lack of commitment. The impact of central bank hawkishness on debt...

In the New-Keynesian model, optimal interest rate policy under uncertainty is formulated without reference to monetary aggregates as long as certain standard assumptions on the distributions of unobservables are satisfied. The model has been criticized for failing to explain common trends in...

Policy counterfactuals based on estimated structural VARs routinely suggest that bringing Alan Greenspan back in the 1970s' United States would not have prevented the Great Inflation. We show that a standard policy counterfactual suggests that the Bundesbank - which is near-universally credited...

In the New-Keynesian model, optimal interest rate policy under uncertainty is formulated without reference to monetary aggregates as long as certain standard assumptions on the distributions of unobservables are satisfied. The model has been criticized for failing to explain common trends in...

The assumption of asymmetric and incomplete information in a standard New Keynesian model creates strong incentives for monetary policy transparency. We assume that the central bank has better information about its objectives than the private sector, and that the private sector has better...

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a sticky pricemodel where the central bank supplies money outrightvia asset purchases and lends money temporarily againstcollateral. The terms of central bank lending affect ra-tioning of money and impact on macroeconomic aggre-gates. The central bank can...

This paper examines the role of the monetary instrument choice for local equilibrium determinacy under sticky prices and different fiscal policy regimes. Corresponding to Benhabib et al.'s (2001) results for interest rate feedback rules, the money growth rate should not rise by more than one for...

We study the revision properties of the Bank of Canada's staff output gap estimates since the mid-1980s. Our results suggest that the average staff output gap revision has decreased significantly over the past 15 years, in line with recent evidence for the U.S. Alternatively, revisions from...

This paper documents macroeconomic forecasting during the global financial crisis by two key central banks: the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The paper is the result of a collaborative effort between the two institutions, allowing us to study the time-stamped...